

# IS SEEING INTENTIONAL?

**1. Taking Aim:** Intentionality, we have been told, is the mark of the mental. Which is little use in marking off the mental until we know what intentionality is. Perhaps the interesting project is to find some sense for 'intentional' which makes the slogan true. But perhaps the slogan rests on a misconception of the mental. This essay will explore those possibilities.

'Intentional' in its usual sense marks much less than all the mental. I may, perhaps, intentionally place myself so as to see what goes on across the street. But when it happens, I do not *intentionally* (nor unintentionally) *see* it. Just so is perception standardly classed a passion.

So 'intentional' is not to have its ordinary sense. What then? Metaphors are on offer. One main one is that of aiming, or being aimed, or directed, at an object: 'object' in some sense corresponding to *accusative*; or object, the sort of thing that falls under concepts, but is not fallen under (a bearer of (first-order properties); or, perhaps, what Frege called 'the particular case'—things (catholic sense, admitting no 'Which?') being as they are (or some thing being as it is). (See 1882, *Kernsatz* 4.)

What, then, is aiming at an object? First, is there always, *per se*, an object aimed at? (It would be cheating to say, 'Yes, but perhaps a non-existent one.'). Taking 'aim' literally, I can aim at a deer in the copse, but not at a deer that isn't there (though I may *think* I am aiming without a deer to aim at). So, perhaps, yes. But it *seems* I may want to meet the winner of the race, though it was called off, or ended in a tie. In which case 'Yes' would *seem* to make wanting non-intentional. We do not want that. So, perhaps, 'No'.

There is a parallel issue about Frege's notion of a mode of presentation of an object (bearer of properties). Some hold that a way of presenting *A* (a contribution to expressing a *singular* thought about *A*) requires *A* for there to be *that* way of presenting anything at all. Others hold that a way of presenting *A* (as above) may be that in a kind world, but in an unkind one, a way of presenting something which presents nothing. There are powerful reasons (given by McDowell (1984, 1986, 1991); present in Russell (1918)) why this last could not be right. I mention this only to signal that construing aiming in the one way or the other, and then holding some wide class of conditions, episodes, postures, or whatever, thus to aim, may be taking sides on quite substantive matters.

There are other issues as to what understanding 'aim' or 'directed at' is to bear. Aiming, on its ordinary meaning, is intentional in involving *intention*. I may shoot Bill unintentionally, aiming at the apple above his head, or intentionally, aiming at him. If I aim, I do at least something intentionally. So reading 'aim', seeing does not aim. So it is not intentional if such aiming marks the intentional. But aiming, sometimes, may be mere harbouring ambition, apart from doing anything to realise it.

Postures towards the world, such as judging (taking something to be so), or wanting, may

be seen as harbouring ambitions: for judging, to be held in a world (suitably) right for it—thus, for judging such-and-such, a world of a certain sort, namely, where *that*; for wanting, that the world become (or remain) one of a certain sort—where I want an alembic (or still want mine), one in which I have one (or it). In such ways, understanding *intentional* as aiming for some object, and aiming as mere harbouring ambition, may bring attitudes within intentionality's ambit.

Seeing, however, still remains without it. On its face, it harbours no ambitions, has no pretensions. In aiming as it does, a judgement imposes a requirement for its success—that requirement identified by (or identifying) what was judged. As Frege noted, it is intrinsic to this that there be a range of cases in which that requirement would be satisfied (where it is satisfiable at all). If I judge that a *bísaro* is beneath the spreading *castanheiro*, there are a variety of ways for me to be right. Another *bísaro* might replace the one in fact there, or that one may be sleeping or awake, rooting for truffles, or pawing the ground; all the while, Pia may be engrossed in her novel, or painting her toes. For to judge is to bring “the particular case” under some given generality. (*Kernsatz* 4.) By contrast, for me to see what I do is just for *that* to be what is before my eyes (and for me to be suitably sensitive to it). My judging there to be a *bísaro* points to a range of cases in which things would be as I judged. My seeing what I did points to no range of cases in which things would be what I saw. If things before me being as they were *was*, in fact, there being a *bísaro* before me, then I saw, *inter alia*, a *bísaro*. There is a range of cases in which one would have seen a *bísaro*. But to see what I did, you would have to have seen *this* one, being just as *it* is. Nothing in my seeing what I did points to some range of cases of things being as they are being their being *that*. There is no such range. So nothing in seeing does anything paralleling what is done by those ambitions an attitude may harbour. So nothing in it points to its having any such ambition. Or so, on their face, things seem.

Judging, Frege suggests, is, *intrinsically*, exposing oneself to risk of error. Wanting is, similarly, intrinsic exposure to risk of disappointment. *Judging*, or wanting, that P does nothing, so far as it goes, to remove such risks. By contrast, seeing the *bísaro* before me, or knowing there to be one, are not ways of exposing oneself to such risks. There are risks where one *asks* something of the world. But not *all* mental phenomena do that. Some are simply ways of taking up its offers. So such asking cannot be the mark of the mental, nor of a notion of intentionality that marks it. Unless, perhaps, such things as seeing, or knowing, factor into a ‘purely mental’ component, which does some asking, and the further fact of the world obliging. But such is not something to be supposed lightly.

So images of aiming, or being directed, at do not seem to capture seeing in their net. Suppose, still attracted to those images, and convinced that seeing *is* intentional, we supposed they *must*. Then we would need to find something seeing asks of the world; so, accordingly, something it pretends, or aims, to be. This would naturally force seeing into the mould of judging. So forcing it, we would, perhaps, insist on seeing as pretending, first, to be revealing of how things are (visually, visibly) in the scene before me, and then revealing of their being thus and so (some way there is for (visible) scenes to be). Many have taken that route. But that way darkness lies. (See my 2004, 2005, forthcoming.) Better to give up either on these metaphors as means for capturing what we shall mean by ‘intentional’, or on the idea that seeing *is* intentional.

A linguistic notion may promise a new idea of what intentionality might be. It is the notion of an *intensional* (or *opaque*) *context* (or *open sentence*). Start with a sentence of some language — ‘Sid ate all of Pia’s pizza’, say. Find in it some term whose function, on a use, is to identify some object (faller under concepts) which the sentence, so used, would then say to be some given way. Erase the term, leaving a blank for future filling in. The result is a *context* (or *open sentence*). For example, ‘Sid ate all of \_\_\_’s pizza.’ Do this repeatedly if you can and like, leaving multiple blanks (a multiply open sentence). For a context to be intensional (with respect to a given blank) is for it to have two features. First, having filled each other blank, filling that blank with two different ways of referring to the same thing is liable to yield two different truth values. Call this failure of substitution. Second, where filling the blank with a name of some object yields a truth, filling it instead by existential quantification may not. So, if ‘\_\_\_ grunts’ had this feature, then ‘Sid grunts’ might be true where ‘There is someone who grunts’ was not. Call this failure of existential generalisation.

Where an open sentence is intensional, what fills it so as to express a thought fixes more as to what thought that is than merely what object (or individual) is thereby thought of. The notion of intensionality says nothing as to what that more might be. Perhaps quite different things in different cases. If so, the notion of intensionality, as such, offers no taxonomy.

Intensionality is a linguistic notion, *intentionality* not. How might the two connect? Here is one simple idea. One *might* call a (sort of) condition, or episode, or process, or whatever, intensional just in case, first, there is a context which speaks of someone (so-and-so) as in (some particular version of) that condition, or engaged in (some particular version of) that episode, or etc., which is intensional with respect to some blank, and, second, it contains no proper context which is also intensional with respect to that blank. (This would need refinement, but will do as an approximation.) Thus, thinking something so would be intentional, on this notion, if, say, ‘Sid thinks that \_\_\_ ate the last piece’ is intensional. (‘\_\_\_ ate the last piece’ is a proper part of that whole, but, presumably, not intensional.)

I am not proposing this. It is just one way to forge a link. In fact, formulating questions about intentionality in linguistic terms may easily yield illusions. I will mention them next in discussing a certain proposal. I have so far spoken as if seeing a *bísaro* requires, at the least, a *bísaro*. Some have claimed this to be so of one, but not another, notion of seeing. I will argue that there is no such other notion. Even if there were, this would make, not *seeing*, but at best only one notion of it, intentional. But there is not.

**2. Ayer and Anscombe:** A. J. Ayer and G. E. M. Anscombe are two of the many who thought they saw two notions of seeing, one intentional. Ayer puts this straightforwardly in terms of *senses* of ‘see’. In one, he tells us,

it is necessary that what is seen should really exist, but not necessary that it should have the qualities that it appears to have. (1940: 23)

In the other,

it is not possible that anything [seen?] should seem to have qualities that it does not really have, but also not necessary that what is seen should really exist. (Ibid)

In Ayer's second sense one may see what is not there. Seeing, so read, might be seen as aiming for what it *misses*, there—promise of catching this notion within intentionality's net. Further, what one sees, in this sense, cannot differ from, and perhaps not outrun, what it seems. One use of 'seem' is tied to attitudes: 'It seems that I will never catch up.' Such is what the facts suggest (to me). Another is perceptual: that *bísaro* beneath the *castanheiro* seems as though spotted (in the dappled sunlight). It would be adding something to say, 'and the *bísaro* actually seems to *be* spotted (thus making the first use of 'seem'). Ayer is not clear which he means. If perceptual 'seem', then his last stricture yields a doubtfully coherent notion. If the first, coherence depends on what necessity there is for a subject to take, or be ascribed, only coherent attitudes. Anyway, Ayer's second sense of 'see', though not his first, is, *if* coherent, a ripe candidate for the intentional.

Anscombe identifies her two notions in terms of different 'uses' of 'see'; different ways of employing it. First, there is

what I shall call the material use of verbs of sense. ... The material use of 'see' is a use which demands a *material* object of the verb. 'You can't have seen a unicorn, unicorns don't exist.' 'You can't have seen a lion, there wasn't any lion there to see.' (1965: 13)

For all of which,

Verbs of sense-perception ... are intentional or essentially have an intentional aspect. (1965: 11)

On the intentional use,

object phrases are used giving objects which are, wholly or in part, merely intentional. This comes out in two features: neither possible non-existence (in the situation), nor indeterminacy, of the object is an objection to the truth of what is said. (1965: 13)

‘Ordinary language’ views and ‘sense-datum’ views make the same mistake, that of failing to recognize the intentionality of sensation ... This failure comes out clearly on the part of an ordinary-language philosopher if he insists that what I say I see must really be there if I am not lying, mistaken, or using language in a ‘queer’, extended (and therefore discountable) way. (Ibid)

Ayer’s second sense of ‘see’ and Anscombe’s intentional use are thus much alike. Both allow for the non-existence of what is seen, allowing for which, as we have seen is a mark of intentionality on some, though perhaps not all, conceptions of it. The ‘indeterminacy’ of the object in Anscombe’s intentional use corresponds, in Ayer, to the impossibility of the object differing from (for Anscombe, outrunning) what it seems. It is indeterminacy akin to that of fiction. Perhaps Maigret was a man of average height. But unless Simenon said so, or what entails so, it is neither so that Maigret was a metre 80, nor that he was a metre 78, nor that he was a metre 77, and so on. Unless such were allowed for, Simenon (if alive) would still be working on his first novel. Similarly, on Anscombe’s second use, I may have seen a (non-existent) robin, but it need neither be so that I saw a red-breasted one nor that I saw an orange-breasted one (assuming there are those two types), unless things so impressed me. For I see, on this use, no more than I am responsive to. Just so, except by losing track of what he was about, or getting caught up in inconsistency, it cannot merely *seem* to Simenon that Maigret was of average height. Just so, too, except in over-haste, or something of the sort, one cannot merely *seem* to see (on Anscombe’s second use) a bird in the nest (while, in fact, it was perched on the branch).

Between the time of Ayer’s two senses and that of Anscombe’s two uses, J. L. Austin expressed a contrary view:

The fact that an exceptional situation may thus induce me to use words primarily appropriate for a different, normal situation is nothing like enough to establish that there are, in general, two different (‘correct and familiar’) *senses* of the words I use, or of any one of them. ... It is not, as Ayer says, that ‘there is no problem so long as one keeps the two usages distinct’; there is no reason to say that there *are* two usages; there is no problem so long as one is aware of the *special circumstances*.

I might say, while visiting the zoo, ‘That is a lion’, pointing to one of the animals. I might also say, pointing to a photograph in my album, ‘That is a lion.’ Does this show that the word ‘lion’ has *two senses*—one meaning an animal, the other a picture of an animal? Plainly not. (1962: 91)

Austin puts his point—since directed against Ayer—in terms of senses. But the real point is: there

is no notion of *seeing* on which it is intentional in Anscombe's sense, or on which either Anscombe's second use, nor Ayer's second sense, are ways of saying someone to *see* things. The different usages of 'see' here are different usages for *any* words; ones other than for describing what those words normally do. The temptation to think otherwise corresponds to a misunderstanding of intensionality, and thereby of intentionality. I turn to that misunderstanding.

**3. The Non-existent:** Intensionality is a *linguistic* phenomenon. Intentionality is a property of conditions, episodes, etc. Trying to capture it linguistically invites confusions. We have just seen one example. Suppose that 'see' has certain linguistic properties—a second sense, say. Before it were shown that a certain perceptual phenomenon, seeing, sometimes has corresponding properties, it would need to be shown that, in that second sense, 'see' speaks of that phenomenon.

A mark of intentionality, it is sometimes said, is something called 'intentional in-existence'. This is sometimes read: what an intentional phenomenon relates one to is there anyway in thought (or in the phenomenon), and has no further need actually to be there. So an intentional phenomenon which relates one to an object (faller under concepts) somehow has the power to relate one to a non-existent one. It *might* also be read: what an intentional phenomenon relates one to, whatever that may be, is there (exists), full stop. No further question of it failing, in any sense, 'really to be there'. But something like the first reading—instanced in the idea that one may see what is not there—is encouraged by a misunderstanding of *intensionality*, plus some notion of its relation to intentionality. So let us help that misunderstanding out of the world.

The intensionality of a context (at a given blank) consists in two features: failure of substitution; failure of existential generalisation. Quine correctly argued that the first entails the second. The second is: if '\_\_\_ F' is intensional, then 'A F' can express a truth while 'There is something which is F' does not. Which is sometimes understood as: 'A F' can express a truth while 'A', in it, refers to nothing. But this reading is wrong.

One can—*perhaps*—see *that* the cow is clearing Hesperus without seeing *that* it is clearing Phosphorous, or that Pia is with Nick without seeing that she is with The Thin Man. One would not think it followed that one might see that 'Pia's brother, Sol, was with Nick' if Pia does not have a brother. One can see that Pia is with Nick in seeing her with Nick. One cannot see 'Sol' with Nick if there is no 'Sol'. In *any* case of seeing that, you cannot see what is not so. It is not the case that Pia's brother is with Nick if she does not have one.

What, then, did Quine prove in proving that failure of substitution entails failure of existential generalisation? One can see that by asking why intensionality is essentially linguistic. Let us try to define it for a concept—say, that of being greasy. Starting with substitution, if this *concept* is intensional, then **a** might satisfy it while **b** does not, even if **a** is **b**. Which would violate Leibniz' law. So there is no such possibility. Now for existential generalisation. Suppose that **a** satisfies *greasy*( ). For existential generalisation to fail here would be for there to be nothing which satisfied the concept. But we just supposed that something did, viz., **a**. Which is to suppose that existential generalisation does not fail. As Frege put it, the existential quantifier is a second-order concept, predicating being satisfied of a first-order concept. We supposed *greasy* to be satisfied in

supposing **a** to satisfy it. *Fertig*. (A concept, Frege also tells us, is a *function* mapping objects into truth-values. Which is just to say that it cannot map one object (**a**, aka **b**) onto two values, nor nothing onto anything.)

A thought is the content of a judgement. Its task is to fix when that judgement would be correct (true). That task can be apportioned into subtasks. A concept is (or is identified by) what would perform a certain sort of sub-task. But this is a task performable at all only in the context of the performance of those other sub-tasks on the apportionment. Choose an object, and a concept may make truth turn on whether *that* one satisfies it. Choose no object, and there is (bracketing quantifying) as yet no work for a concept to do; no sub-task within a thought to be performed by anything.

A one-place first-order concept just *is* of a way for an object to be. What we have just seen is that an intensional context does not (as such) express a concept; speaks, on its own, of *no* way for an object to be. We may now recall that it was precisely ways for a subject to be that were to be caught in intentionality's net. An intensional context speaks of no such candidate. Consider, e.g., '\_\_\_ is so-called because of his consumer habits.' 'John is so-called because of his consumer habits' may express truth, while, though John is also known as Fats, 'Fats is so-called because of his consumer habits' does not. But that just reflects the fact that there is no such thing as 'being so-called because of one's consumer habits.' So 'Someone is so-called because of his consumer habits' (where 'someone' is a quantifier) says nothing. It is not false. It is not even well-formed. It is just nonsense.

And this is what Quine proved. Where substitution fails, you simply cannot generalise. You are not yet speaking of any way for something, or things, to be; so generalising can only yield nonsense. (*Not falsehood*.) An intensional context is *no* source of truths about nothing—a bizarre idea anyway, come to think of it. A *context*, so an intensional one, has, by definition, blanks to be filled by reference to *objects* (bearers of properties). Otherwise, talk of failure of substitution, etc., makes no sense. Fill a blank with what does *not* refer to an object (one that there *is*, to wax pleonastic), and you fail to say *anything* to be so, either truly or falsely. Fats, perhaps, is called John because of his consumer habits. The same could not be so of 'Pia's brother' if she has none.

'John is so-called because of his consumer habits' is true because he is called *John* because of his consumer habits; 'Fats is so-called ...' is false because he is not called *Fats* because of his consumer habits. This points to a linguistic problem. Only when an intensional context has its blanks filled does it speak of a way for something to be, which it can then, truly or falsely, say someone to be. The problem is to say what contribution the fillers—terms which normally contribute only in identifying an object—make to determining *what* way for something to be is thus spoken of.

But it is ways for things to be which are meant to be *intentional* or not. An *intensional* context speaks of no such way. *Such* a context needs to be filled before we can so much as detect, in the filled result, any way for a thing to be, thus anything which might be intentional or not. Being called 'John' because of one's consumer habits is, perhaps, an intentional condition (though presumably it is not). 'Being so-called because of one's consumer habits' is (without anaphoric reference for that 'so-called' to pick up) simply ill-formed, not (mention of) a way for one to be.

Though Nick Charles is fictional, might there not be truth in some claim that he smoked Melachrinos, not Murads? So it seems. The questions are: What sorts of claims? What sorts of truths? Does Nick Charles show that smoking is something one can do without existing? The point so far is: whatever one says to this in the case of smoking, there is so far no reason to say any different for intentional phenomena, whatever these may be; certainly not for seeing.

**4. Seeing Things:** ‘See that’ seems as intensional as ‘think that’, however intensional that is. What of ‘See (NP)’—for such NPs as ‘Sid’, ‘the sun setting’, ‘the carbonised condition of the toast’? To start with, what you see (unless you miss it) is what is there. If I see Sid staggering, and Sid is the regional representative of Duvel, then I see the regional representative of Duvel staggering, whether or not I know that, or can even entertain the thought. So, it seems, ‘See (NP)’ cannot fail substitutivity *salva veritate*. Which means it does not form intensional contexts. There is so far no cause for thinking you can see what is not there.

Ayer’s second sense of ‘see’, and Anscombe’s ‘material use’, are not, on their face, uses on which substitutivity fails—though there may be a poverty of things to substitute. If, on these uses, I see a bird in a nest, or a bird with a red head, and *if* the bird is a grouse, or red is Almodóvar’s favourite colour, then I see a grouse in the nest, and a bird with a head in Almodóvar’s favourite colour. If they are right, though, then on these uses I may see what is not there. There is no reason why this need entail failure of substitutivity, any more than failure of substitutivity entails it.

It is widely thought that it may be true that Pia thinks Nick Charles smokes Melachrinos; it is nothing against the truth of this that there is no such person as Nick Charles. (Though it *might* matter if there were no such fictional character.) Which has encouraged some to think that it is possible to *think* something to be so in thinking of *no one* that *he* smokes Melachrinos. We have seen there to be no such consequence. (I can tell you what the square of some integer is; but not what the square of nothing is.) Perhaps we can see, in another way, why one should not be so encouraged. There are, to be sure, occasions on which one could express a truth—some truth or other—in saying, ‘Pia thinks Nick Charles smokes Melachrinos.’ But those are very likely to be occasions on which one could continue the monologue, truly, along lines like these: ‘But he doesn’t. He smokes Murads.’ Where ‘He smokes Murads’ may express truth in speaking of no one, so might anything. Which signals something: on those occasions on which one would thus speak truth, some special sort of discourse is afoot. (Another signal is the occasions on which one could not thus speak truth. The question is whether, as generally supposed, only Anabaptists smoke Melachrinos. ‘Nick Charles smokes Melachrinos and he is no Anabaptist’, Zoë helpfully suggests. ‘There’s no such person’ is a fair response.)

If I am telling you how the Thin Man stories go, I am free to relate anything occurring in them, in straight assertoric form— “The mayor shucked an oyster at midnight with a switchblade”, if so the story goes. What is required for truth is not that the mayor shucked, etc., but that so the (Thin Man) story goes. An utterance of a sentence such as “The mayor shucked ... ” *can* be an assertion as to how things are around us. But it can also be other things; in this case, a commitment to how a certain story goes; how things are in *it*. “The mayor shucked ... ” provides a description for the way things are. But it need not be *used* for describing how things are. If it has



that use, it inevitably has others. Describing how things would be if as per the story, or just how they are in the story, is one such.

One cannot think things so in thinking of no one that he is thus and so. One does not do it by thinking things of a character in a story. One simply mentions ways for things, or some thing, to be as a means of recounting the story—saying how things are *in it*. There is something one might think in thinking the story to be one in which a certain character, Nick Charles, smoked Melachrinos. One can sometimes be *said* to think this in words, ‘He thinks Nick Charles smoked Melachrinos.’ There is nothing one might think in thinking someone non-existent to have smoked Melachrinos. There *are* no non-existent someones. A non-existent someone being a way there is for *someone* to be is not a way for things to be: there is no such thing as that. There is no such way to think things. Name someone, say him to have smoked Melachrinos, and you have described a way for things to be. You may *use* such a description for saying how things are: as thus described. You may also use it for countless other ends, e.g., in saying how a story goes. Such other uses do not suggest the absurdity that the description, ‘smoked Melachrinos,’ may be true of someone there is not. What goes here for smoking Melachrinos goes, too, for thinking someone did. So, too, for seeing the Murad in the ashtray when there is no Murad to be seen (even if, in some sense, it is for someone as though there were).

So far, then, (unsurprisingly) we have found no cause for thinking that a context with a space for a reference to *something* can be made true, or even so much as true or false, by filling it up with something which refers to nothing; or, in non-linguistic terms, that there could be a thought which is, *inter alia*, about being such-and-such way for an object to be, but not about any object, or some range of them, *being* that way. Such would violate what Frege called the context principle: constituents of a thought (on a decomposition) are so only *en masse*. Frege need not yet fear.

Yet another use for descriptions for the way things are. Pia is in her chaise longue daydreaming of touring Spain. ‘What are you doing now?’ Sid asks. ‘Running with the bulls,’ she replies. In a chaise longue? But no. Pia is not telling blatant falsehood. She is simply saying what she is daydreaming—imagining. She is right if, when Sid asks, *that* is what she is picturing doing. Running with the bulls is the way her daydream runs. There need be no further running in Pamplona.

Vocabulary *for* describing what is happening in Pamplona is used here for another purpose: describing what Pia is imagining happening—how things *would* be if as imagined. Such talk has two features. First, Pia has a sort of authority over what happens in her daydream which resembles the authority we normally have over what we mean by our words. If I think ‘tenuous’ means *tenable*, I may be correspondingly confused as to what I *mean* when I call a position ‘tenuous’; as to how I am using my words. Barring such confusion, how I mean to be using them is, within wide latitude, up to me to say. It takes special circumstances for me to be mistaken as to whether I meant ‘bank’ to mean riverside. Similarly, if Pia says that in her daydream she is running in Pamplona, and then, describing her (imagined) surroundings, gives a perfect description of Burgos, *perhaps* she is daydreaming about Burgos. Generally speaking, though, when someone, describing her daydream, says she is running along a beach, it is hard to make sense of a reply, ‘No, you’re not. You’re swinging in a hammock.’ Second, as Anscombe claims for

her 'intentional use' of 'see', daydreaming is sketchy as fiction. As Pia passes the cathedral (in her daydream), there need be no answer to questions as to where the shadows fell, or what colour the stone was, or even whether the bells tolled.

Now we turn to 'see (NP)'. Here is the sort of case which inspired Anscombe's intentional use of 'see'. Looking at the sheet of paper, tired and emotional, I see two sheets. (Cf. 'How many fingers?') I feel pressure on my leg (though it has been amputated). I see rails rushing ahead. The psychologist works his magic with the successions of lights and I see, now clockwise, now counterclockwise, motion where there is none. Fiddling with the card of the bird and the card of the nest in the ophthalmologist's machine, I arrange for me to see the bird in the nest. (Anscombe's example. She is impressed by the fact that the ophthalmologist does not need first to teach me a nonce-sense for 'see' and only then to pose his question. (1965: 12-13.))

Suppose that 'N sees O' were a form of description for a subject's relation to some object (happening, etc.) in his surroundings—as on Anscombe's supposedly contrasting 'material use' of 'see'. Would it then, *ipso facto*, or at least reasonably, acquire additional uses on the model of 'Pia is running with the bulls', used, say, for describing how things are day-dreamed to be, how imagined, etc.? Might it be usable for describing how things looked to N—like, as though, such-and-such? Plausibly, yes. If I am trying to describe my tired and emotional (or, again, hypoglycaemic) state, I may, staring at the sheet of paper, say, 'I see two sheets', using that description for a relation to *surroundings* to describe things looking as they do *to me*. If you want to know how things look to me, it is as though there were two sheets of paper. Similarly for rails rushing, and similarly for all the other cases above. It is no wonder that I need learn no nonce-sense of 'see' before grasping the ophthalmologist's question. I grasp, effortlessly, that a description *for* one sort of thing can be used to describe another sort by the above sort of connection.

'I am running through Pamplona' speaks of doing something with one's legs in a certain Spanish city; something which could *not* be done anywhere else; something which could not be done while lying still in a *chaise longue*. But if you know what it would be for someone to be doing that, you can also know what it would be to be day-dreaming doing it. You would know this in knowing what would be happening (on some suitable occasion) if things were as in the daydream. Similarly, 'I see two sheets of paper' speaks of my standing in a certain way towards *two* sheets of paper. But if you understand what it would be for me to be doing that, you may also know how things look to me, or are for me, visually, now, in the grips of my hypoglycaemia. If you have ever felt pressure on your leg, you can know how things feel to me, now literally legless, at this moment, if you understand that it is, for me, the way things feel when there is pressure on one's leg—and know, as you might, how *that* feels.

Anscombe asks only for an intentional *use* of 'see'. Has that not just been provided? Is it not right that with 'see' working as thus described, one can see two sheets of paper when there is only one? First, note that if this *is* an intentional use, then there is, equally well, an intentional use of 'run with the bulls', on which this can be done without benefit of bulls, or need to run. Equally well for 'is sitting in a *chaise longue*', or virtually any other context (open sentence) you choose. But no one ever thought running with bulls, or sitting in a *chaise longue*, is intentional. And if everything is, the distinction disappears.

Second, this points to the dangers of sliding from a linguistic phenomenon to a a phenomenon language might describe. 'Sid sees two sheets' might express a truth without benefit of two sheets. Since 'two sheets' is not a referring expression here, we cannot move directly to an *intensional* context by deleting it. But there *is* a context, 'Sid sees \_\_\_', where the blank is to be filled up by a reference to something—what functions as a name. I doubt that this can be filled with a (would-be) name, which fails to refer to anything, so as to express a truth even on the above special use. Fiction, again, is beside the point.

But which forms of words might or might not express truth of Sid's situation is not really to the point. The question was whether there is a notion of *seeing* on which this is intentional. Is *seeing*, on one understanding *it* admits of, something one can do *in re* what does not exist, or is not there within one's sight? Where 'Pia is running with the bulls' is so used as to express a truth while Pia is sitting in her *chaise longue*, far from any bulls, it is precisely *not* used to describe what Pia is doing, or at least not to describe that as running with some bulls. It is used to describe what she is *imagining* doing. Just so that it does not follow from its truth, so used, that one may run with bulls by sitting in a chair, no bulls present. Similarly, when, on the above account, 'Sid sees two sheets of paper' expresses a truth though there are no two sheets of paper, it is not being used to describe what Sid is doing, or at least not what he is doing as seeing two sheets of paper. It is being used to describe what, for him, it is as though he were doing. It accordingly fails to follow from the truth of the description *so* used that seeing a sheet of paper is something one can do without benefit of paper.

Not all uses of 'see' which may give the appearance of intentionality in Anscombe's sense are to be accounted for in the above way. Austin points to examples like these: 'I see a silver speck on the horizon', while on the horizon is only the daily flight form Rio. This is a 747: a very large airplane, hardly a speck. So the speck I see, the thought is, is a speck that is not there. But this, as Austin points out, is thinking wrongly. There are various things there being a speck on the horizon might be understood to be. One thing this might be understood to be is for there to be something on the horizon which, viewed from here, and at this distance, appears as a speck. On such an understanding, an airplane on the horizon would be there being a speck on the horizon. The speck you see, on this understanding of there being one, just *is* the airplane. Here truth comes from a particular understanding of 'speck', not a particular understanding of 'see'. No special use of that verb is at work.

A minimal conclusion. Examples of the sort Anscombe gives, or of the sort illustrated above, give no reason to think that there is any intentional notion of seeing. When Anscombe marks out her intentional use of 'see', she is concerned centrally with issues of non-existence—orthogonal at least to *intensionality*—little, or less, with substitutivity—a mark identifying that phenomenon. There is no case for failure of substitutivity in contexts formed from 'see (NP)', even on Anscombe's supposed use. Failure would, anyway, not bear on her issues of non-existence. Nor do issues of non-existence clearly bear on substitutivity. It remains open how either issue links to a notion of intentionality on which this might be the mark of the mental.

**5. Beyond Judging:** A feature of Ayer's 'second sense of 'see' is that, in this sense, "it is not

possible that anything should seem to have qualities it does not really have". (1940: 23) His example of something we can 'see' in this sense is: "a silvery speck no bigger than a sixpence." This is to make the objects of seeing, in this sense, very special sorts of things—*not*, notably, objects of *sight*: sight involves the *eyes*; anything *they* afforded awareness of would be inherently liable to be other than, through them, it seemed. In fact, such a thing could not have any of the visible properties things in our surroundings are liable to have (or at least liable to have or lack). Nor could it have any other properties which visual awareness might reveal. One could not intelligibly *judge* it to have or lack any such property, thus making one's correctness turn how *it* is. So if such a thing seemed to be red or square, say, it would thus be seeming to have properties it could not have. If it could not seem to have properties it lacked, this would just mean that it could not so much as *seem* to be red or square. It would be irrelevant to this if, as Ayer suggests, what is seen in this sense might be non-existent.

Frege maps the bounds here (1918; see my 2005). I condense the case. If the tomato on my plate, or my beach towel, is red, this locates them within webs of factive meaning. It means, say, that my towel will enrage bulls, or sticklebacks, or that it has certain reflectance properties, or that others will be impressed by my taste, or lack of it, in towel colours, or that it will be the same colour as certain other towels. Which means, *ipso facto*, that if, on a certain occasion, based on my exposure to the towel, I judge it to be red, I am inherently liable to be wrong: what lies on those other nodes within these webs in which my towel's being red would find itself (if it is red) may just *mean* that the towel is not, in fact, red. Such could not happen for any way something I saw in Ayer's second sense seemed, as seen, to be. So *such* a thing's being red, if it could accomplish this, could not lie within such webs of meaning. Which is just to say that whatever way such a thing might be, it would not be being *red*. So it could not seem red, because then it would seem to be what it was not, violating Ayer's dictum.

Those supposed objects of seeing in Ayer's second sense would need not to be denizens of our shared environment. So if they had *observable* properties, these would be of a very different sort from any had by such denizens. Ayer's items would belong to what Frege calls 'contents of someone's consciousness': there is someone one would have to be to be aware of, or acquainted, with them; they coexist with that person's awareness of them. So only that person could be aware, e.g., visually, of such an item's having such a property. Which means, as Frege argues, that only that person could so much as entertain the thought, of any such item, that it had any such property. Which, for Frege, means that there are really no such thoughts—so no such facts—at all. Again, in brief, such a thought, if there were one, could be *true* only in a new sense of 'true'; not in the same sense in which it is true that I have just eaten the last crisp. But it would be up to the only person who could entertain that thought to give 'true' such a new sense. Which proves an unintelligible project.

Frege wrote,

With the step by which I win myself an environment I expose myself to risk of error. (1918: 73)

But the environment is all there is to judge of. He could have said: With the step by which I win myself the possibility of judging *anything* I expose myself to risk of error. So there is no such thing as judging truly (or perhaps truly, perhaps falsely) of something that it is F, where seeming so would make it so. So there is no such thing as something *being* what it could not but be if it so seems. So the objects (accusatives) of 'see' in Ayer's second sense cannot be *objects*: things which *are* a multitude of ways, and which might intelligibly be *thought* to be one way or another.

What, then, might we see in Ayer's second sense? A silvery speck, he suggests. But grammar might mislead less if we change examples. Perhaps Dick Cheney standing on his head is the sort of thing one might see in this sense. Unfortunately, Cheney exists. But perhaps no headstands by him do. Which will do *here*. Now, 'things', in 'things being as they are, may—typically does—bear a catholic sense, a mark of which is that one cannot ask 'Which things?'. It is things being as they are which is things being, or not being, those ways there are for things to be—such that sloths sleep, or such that Cheney is standing on his head. Cheney standing on his head is a way for things to be. Cheney standing on his head is something which (from the perspective of logical space) might occur, or at least might fail to.

One cannot see a way for things to be (though one might see, or witness, things being that way, if so they are). Equally, one cannot see something which might occur or not, though one might see it occurring, or happening. If Cheney stands on his head, you might see him doing so. Seeing Cheney standing on his head is also, presumably, something one might do in Ayer's second sense of 'see'. Cheney would have to stand on his head—things would have to be *that* way—for you to witness him—take in his—doing so. But, presumably, you might see him standing on his head in Ayer's second sense of 'see' without him doing so. *What* you saw, in this sense, would not be (as what you *see* would be) part of things being as they are.

Things being as they are, in the normal catholic sense of 'things', is the extent of what there is to judge of. *Just this* is what would be things being some way there is for things to be; what may make a judgement true or false. Although Cheney standing on his head, *if* it occurs, is part of things being as they are, what you 'see' in Ayer's second sense when you see Cheney standing on his head is not. If 'seeing' (second sense) Cheney standing on his head is a visual experience, it is (by contrast with seeing some actual headstand) not of what, in being as it is, *shows* one thus to have experienced such-and-such (e.g., some *headstand*-facsimile). What one *thus* experiences does not support a judgement. *Its* being as it is could not be Cheney standing on his head, no matter *what* things being that way was understood to come to. If Ayer 'sees' (second sense) Cheney standing on his head, it may seem (look) *to Ayer* as though Cheney were so standing. But this cannot be a matter of Ayer's visual awareness of something which instances things so seeming—as Jack Black's impression of Cheney so standing might.

Ayer's insistence that what you 'see' (second sense) cannot diverge in how it is from how it seems now comes to this. It cannot *seem* that you thus 'see' Cheney standing on his head, whereas you are actually 'seeing' Rove standing on his hands, or Bush standing on his own feet; nor that you see a star above Emerson Hall which *seems* to flicker, but really does not. There is no more *to* what you see, in this sense, than you are prepared to tell; no way for it to merely *seem* to you that

you see things being this way rather than that. One might resist at this point. Suppose, instead, we agree: this is what seeing (second sense) is to be.

Frege's point then gets new grip. Suppose it cannot merely seem to me that I see (second sense) A, while what I really see (second sense) is in fact B. Then any posture I take to the effect that my experience is one of seeing (second sense) such-and-such does not expose me to risk of error. So it is not a *judgement* to that effect. An attitude towards whether I am seeing (second sense) Cheney standing on his head cannot, so far, be a way for me to make the fate of a posture turn on how *things* are. Perhaps with such a posture by me present, someone else could judge something to the effect that I saw (second sense) Cheney standing on his head. Perhaps there is *then* something for *someone* to judge. Perhaps in the right circumstances that someone could be me. But then there would be, for me, risk of error as to what it was I thus experienced—room, say, for confusing Cheney and Tamberlane. And what made me right or wrong—decided the fate of *this* posture—would not be merely what I experienced in seeing what I did (second sense) being as it was. If I think I see Cheney smirking, I am right or wrong according as what I have in view is or is not (an instance of) Cheney smirking. Its seeming so to me hardly makes this so. This is entirely a matter of how *things* are. It would not be like that where I perceived my seeing what I did (Ayer's second sense) as my seeing Cheney smirking.

That idea of intentionality which Ayer expresses as above, and which, so expressed, points to loss of judgement, Anscombe expresses in terms of the poverty of facts about accusatives of what speaks of the intentional—the sort of poverty of fiction. No *more* is so of what I see on Anscombe's intentional use than I *recognise* as so, or am prepared to. Here, too, there is no question of the *facts* as to what I see outrunning this. The word I just used—'recognise'—may speak of two quite different phenomena, a distinction marked in German by 'anerkennen' and 'erkennen'. *Erkennung* is pure cognitive achievement, *Anerkennung* not. *Anerkennung* is acknowledging, or crediting, counting, or, perhaps endowing with a status—as, say, certifying a plumber. For Frege, stating is the *Anerkennung* of the truth of what is stated—commitment. (1918: 65) There is something to *erkennen* just where there is something to judge. There may be, anyway, things to *anerkennen*. One may, anyway, *anerkennen* what one sees (Ayer's second sense) as Cheney on his head, even if there is no question of one's *judging* this. Similarly, one may *anerkennen* seeing the hen in the nest, even if, minus such stances, *Erkennung* is not yet in the cards. (On this point only, cf. seeing figures in a Pollock.) For Anscombe, where there is no prospect of such *Anerkennung*—e.g., of the hen's seeming to have 1013 feathers—there is no question of something to *erkennen* either. Thus far, her position fits within Frege's bounds. The mistake, if she makes it, is just to think that what is in question here is *seeing*. It is, essentially, of things to judge about.

For judgement to come into question, Frege teaches us, one must win oneself an environment. It is not an *environment* one describes in describing what one experienced visually as the hen being in the nest. Here, too, judgement is not yet in the picture. This is not yet to say that there is *no* way for it to enter. If I *anerkennen* the hen being in the nest, *that* is a feature of *our* shared environment. It is thus a possible judgement that I did this or not. Which is enough to show that there *can* be truth, or falsehood, to be told in saying me now to see the hen in the nest, or two sheets of paper, on *some* use of 'see'—perhaps that use I suggested above. The question

here is just what sort of truth it is. That it was for me as though the hen were in the nest may be part of how things are. Things being, visually, thus and so, where one could not witness this without *being* me, is not part of things being as they are. A stance that I saw the hen in the nest cannot have its correctness decided by how what only I *could* witness was. Such is Frege's lesson.

Suppose seeing the hen in the nest were being in a certain neural state. Now there is something for *one* to do, seeing the hen in the nest, which *one* can do by getting into the right state (practicalities aside). The situation is comparable to seeing the hen in the nest, hidden in the mass of dots in a puzzle picture: the image is *there*, it may take a lot of work to get it into focus. When, after days of staring at the painting, I finally spot the hen, what I do hardly fits Anscombe's intentional use of 'see'. Of course there is no real hen clucking away on, and heating up, the canvas. Nor is there a real horse attached to Rubens' canvas of Cathérine de Medicis seated on one. When we talk of seeing vapours coming from the horse's nostrils, of course we are speaking of seeing an *image* of that—yet another use of 'see'. What we are *not* doing is speaking of seeing something not there to be seen. Similarly, I suggest, where seeing A is being in a certain neural state. There *is* something to be seen by getting in that neural state. Not that there are chickens in your brain. But nor are there any on a canvas.

So far, then, Ayer's sense, and Anscombe's use, fit well into the picture I have drawn. Consider once again daydreaming. When Sid asks, of Pia's daydream, what she is doing now, and she answers, 'Running with the bulls', it would be quite unnatural to think that what has happened is that Pia has observed something being as it is, and recognised *that* as its being such that she is running with some bulls—not even as one may observe a canvas, or a photo, being as it is and recognise that *that* is Pia running with the bulls (an image of it, of course). Rather, the daydream is a playing-out, in Pia's head, of a certain story; Pia gets to tell the story (modulo such things as confusing Pamplona with Burgos). Pia's answer to Sid is thus not very naturally read as a *judgement* as to what she is experiencing in daydreaming as she is. It is something at least akin to *Anerkennung*. It is, anyway, a form of story-telling. Such things as 'I see two sheets of paper' (as above) are, anyway, akin to story-telling: there is that characteristic poverty of fact about the paper seen. It is not *pure* story-telling: I do not get to say just whatever I want. But *Anerkennung* plays a like role in it.

Again, the question is not whether some form of words—say, 'I see a hen in a nest'—can say what is true where no hen is in any nest. No doubt such forms *can* state such truths. The question is *what* truths these are. Ones to make of *seeing*, on one understanding of *it*, an intentional phenomenon? Nothing yet so indicates. And there are counter-indications. The central task of seeing, along with other forms of perceiving—hearing, feeling (with your fingers), etc.—in a thinker's life is to allow the world to bear, for that thinker, on what he is to think (and do) according as it bears on what is *so* (*inter alia*, as to the thing to do). The world: things being as they are; that is, the environment we all inhabit being as it is.

If I adjust the handles *so* and see the hen in the nest, this may mean—and I may thus learn from the experience—that I am astigmatic. What I thus experience—my 'seeing' the hen in the nest just *then*—bears on what is so; my experiencing it bears for me on what to think. But it is not like that with seeing. *Seeing* the lion before me makes the lion's presence bear on what I am to think as to there being a lion before me: I may, properly, judge that there is on grounds of the

lion's presence. The lion's presence may *thereby* bear, for me, on what else to think—e.g., that I am glad I made my will—according to what it *means* (as a lion's presence before you means that it would be good to have made a will).

What bears on whether I am astigmatic is *my seeing* (Anscombe's use) the hen in the nest with the handles adjusted *so*. It is my being affected as I am. It is not that there is, independent of that, a hen in a nest to so affect me; nor something which looks like one; nor an image of one. Such would be something there was for *one* to see (from a suitable vantage point). The hen in the nest is none other than how things look to *me*; something present only with my stance towards my experiencing visually as I do. Things being as they *visibly* are in the Sahara before me is, recognisably, a lion being present. *I* can tell it is that; *one* can tell. For things to be as they thus are just is for there to be a lion. This model does not fit the hen in the nest. It is not that things looking *thus* is the hen looking as though in the nest (so that my taking in things so looking is, in other words, my 'seeing' the hen in the nest). It is not as though things so looking is what *one* might be visually aware of. There is no looking here other than looking to *me*; and there is no looking to *me* here apart from my being so impressed. My being so impressed is not here my responding to what is so *recognisable*, so nor my *recognising* (*erkennen*). That notion of recognising does not fit here.

There is no cause to think that seeing (Anscombe's intentional use, Ayer's second sense) is *visual* awareness of what bears on *what* it is I thus experience as seeing what I do in the veldt is visual awareness of what bears on whether I confront a male or female lion. Males have a certain look, females a certain other. I may or may not see the difference. It is anyway there for *one* to see. Whereas what bears on whether I see a hen in a nest, or hovering above it, is not whether I confront, visually, what has the one look, or what has the other (whether I can tell or not).

**6. Looking and Watching:** Perhaps one trouble here is that intensionality—a linguistic phenomenon—is not so much as a clue to what intentionality—a supposed mark of the mental—might be. If some once thought it was, they misread failure of existential generalisation. What, then, *is* intentionality? Does it have anything to do with being *about*, without being about anything? Wittgenstein remarked: you can look for someone when he is not there, but not hang him when he is not there. Looking for, along with wanting and hoping, are clear cases of intentionality if anything is. Perhaps there is a clue in Wittgenstein's distinction. First, though, does it bear on being about the non-existent?

'A fountain of youth', in 'look for a fountain of youth', is not a name. Nor need 'the fountain of youth nearest to Miami' be one. 'Look for \_\_\_' can be completed by a name. But these other completions show nothing about what happens then. So far, *intensionality* is not touched on. Might 'Sid wants N' be true, N functioning in that context as a *name*, but naming nothing? The idea seems absurd. To be a name just *is* to make the whole it is a part of about some individual—have its truth turn essentially on how *that* individual is. A name which names nothing cannot do this. Consider cases. 'Sid wants to meet King Edward IX', or 'Syd wants to eat a Mars Bar' ('Syd' naming Sid's 16<sup>th</sup> century ancestor). (Where Sid has in mind a series of organised mishaps resulting in an Edward IX next week, 'Edward IX' does not function as a name in saying what he



wants.) ‘Sid wants ...’ should answer some question what it is that Sid wants. There is no such thing as ‘meeting King Edward IX’. There is no such person to meet. So saying, or trying to say, Sid to want to do *that* is not providing such an answer. It is not identifying anything to be done; hence not anything Sid could want to do. Put ‘meet Edward IX’ in scare-quotes, and let there be a story about what Sid mistakenly thinks is such a thing to do, and matters may change. If ‘wants to do X’ is for identifying something there *is* to do as something someone wants to do, it inevitably has further uses in identifying what someone *imagines* there is to do as something he *imagines* he wants to do. Again, Syd could not have wanted to eat a Mars Bar, since there was, then, no such thing (even in the planning). At best he could have dreamed of some future confection to be called ‘Mars Bar’. Wanting to eat such a thing is not wanting to eat a Mars Bar. Syd could only then have wanted things he could then have got in mind.

So far, no signs that ‘Sid wants \_\_\_’ is intensional. What about substitutivity? If Nicole is really Mom, can Sid want Nicole, but not Mom? He can, I suppose, if he can *think* that Nicole, but not Mom, makes *churros* just right. It is not at all clear that he can do that either. If he could, it would not help him want, or think of, things (individuals) there are not. Nothing would, though derivative uses of ‘wants ...’ (like derivative uses of ‘smokes ...’) may make it *sound* that way. Nor is it clear how any of this links to *intentionality*.

Intensionality does not require that a context could be filled so as to yield truth, where the filler referred to nothing. If it did, it would be questionable to say the least. The role of a name is to make the whole it is part of express a singular thought: a thought whose truth turns precisely on how *such-and-such* (so-and-so) is. Whereas a general thought may be that there is someone who is *blah*, for a singular thought, there is someone such that the thought is that *he* is *blah*. A name which referred to nothing could not effect this. For it to be a *name* would be for it to play the role a name does without identifying an individual—an absurd idea anyway, and one which collapses singular thoughts into general ones. I omit further discussion.

One thing suggested so far is that there are two uses of ‘looking for’, ‘wants’, etc., paralleling those two uses of ‘see’ and of ‘run’—for saying what someone *saw*; for saying what it is for him as though he saw; for saying where someone ran, for saying where he imagined running. The first use of ‘is looking for’ is for saying what it is that someone is looking for; of ‘wants’ for saying what it is someone wants. The second sort of use of ‘look for’ occurs where there is a name which names nothing, or nothing the searcher could have had in mind—‘Edward IX’, ‘Mars Bar’. It is for saying what it is someone imagines there is to look for, or to do. ‘Looking for a fountain of youth’ can be the first sort. ‘A fountain of youth’, again, is not a name. How to understand *this* sort of case?

Wanting and looking for are, on their face, relational. If one can look for what is not there—a fountain of youth—what this suggests is that the relation is not to an *object*. So a relation to what? There is a way for someone to be: having found a fountain of youth. It is a perfectly good way for someone to be, even if it will never be instanced by anyone being as he is. It is not intensional (since not an open sentence), and, I will suggest, not plausibly intentional either, even if one cannot find what one was not looking for, or at least what one does not register, and looking for *is*, or registering should prove, intentional. Looking for can be a relation to a way for things to be. It can be, roughly, *aiming* for things to be that way; trying to achieve that. Like any relation, it

is not one something can bear, but bear to nothing. Which is why it is not one one can bear to 'meeting Edward IX'. So, again, if 'Sid wants to meet/is looking for Edward IX' might sometimes express a truth, this will not be one as to what it is that Sid is looking for, or who he wants to meet, but rather, say, one about what he *imagines* he is looking for, or wants to meet.

There may be intentionality about. But the only relating to nothing is not relating to anything. This goes for aiming at and being directed toward. What, then, might intentionality be? Looking for and wanting, I have suggested, are relations to ways for things to be. For there to be a given way for things to be, there may or may not need to be given objects. You cannot *literally* be older than Methuselah without Methuselah. You can hope to meet an honest man some day without there being any. If a given way for things to be thus requires such-and-such object, there is no such way for one to relate to unless there is that object. A relation to a way for things to be might hold independent of whether that way is instanced. Such a relation need not be intentional. My *diospireiro* bears a relation to this way for things to be: it bearing persimmons. The relation is: it fails at this. My *diospireiro* does not, presumably, enjoy intentionality.

To capture this difference we might return to the idea of being directed towards, or aiming at. Looking for, I said, aims at (the instancing of) a certain way for things to be. Wanting (to be rich, say) is directed towards this. And so on. Where there is aiming, there is success or failure. Wants may be realised, or frustrated, looking for may be successful or not. The state, or circumstance, of N looking for, or wanting, such-and-such, imposes a condition on such success, much as what expresses a thought may thereby impose a condition on its own truth. My *diospireiro* does not *aim* to produce persimmons. It just does its thing. Its doing whatever that may be identifies no range of cases in which it would be a *success*, or *correct*, in doing what it does. Perhaps here we find the marks of intentionality.

But is this right? Why not say that my *diospireiro* aims at producing persimmons, and that an unhealthy *diospireiro*, which does not produce, is not a success at what it aims at? One answer runs on these lines. If you are looking for a fountain of youth, or want to find one, then, so long as you remain in that condition, you have reason to carry on with certain courses of action, which, once the success has been achieved, you thereby have reason to stop. You need to know when to stop looking. Part of that is knowing when to give up; but part is knowing when *looking* is no longer in the cards: the goal has been reached. Looking for is thus connected, by its aims, to reasons in a way that being such as to bear persimmons if healthy is not. If my *diospireiro* becomes healthy and bears, that gives it no *reason* to do anything. It is not the sort of thing to have reasons. Perhaps that is fundamental. Those for whom things can be reasons are intentional creatures; intentional states are essentially such as to impose them. Such is *one* notion of intentionality.

If we think of intentionality along such lines, is intentionality the mark of the mental? Perhaps those creatures with mental lives just are those apt for intentional states. But is a *state* (circumstance, process, etc.) mental just in case it is intentional? Tim Crane, in a recent defence of Brentano's thesis ("Intentionality, the mind's 'direction upon its objects', is what is distinctive of mental phenomena" (Crane, 1998: 1)) remarked,

If perception were the only mental state under discussion, intentionalism [Brentano's thesis] would not be a controversial thesis. (1998: 4)

Exactly not so, one would have thought. There are mental phenomena, like looking for something, which aim at something, have a goal, are directed. And there are others which, to speak loosely, aim at nothing, but rest where they have arrived—ones which are, in some sense, factive, purely relations to the way things *are*. Perception—seeing, for example—would seem to be a central example of that second sort of case. Knowing would be another. In some sense of 'should', there is a way things should be according to a subject who is looking for someone. By contrast, one simply sees what is before him (modulo acuity, attention, etc.). My seeing the lion in the grass (or the rabbit) neither realises nor harbours any aim *I* have. It does not even require taking the lion for a lion (and not a rabbit). (Seeing *that* is different in this last respect. But this does not seem to make *it* intentional either.)

Why might Crane think perception was a clear case of intentionality? I only proposed a notion of intentionality—on which perception is, *prima facie*, not intentional. Perhaps there are others on which it is intentional. Perhaps he has some such notion in mind. Crane considers two elucidations of intentionality. The first is Brentano's, which Crane renders,

Every intentional act 'includes something as an object within itself' ... the object on which the mind is directed exists *in* the mental act itself. For example, in hearing a sound, the sound ... —a physical phenomenon—is contained within the act of hearing the sound—a mental phenomenon. (1998: 3-4)

Here Crane speaks of direction at an *object*, rather than, as here, at a way for things to be. This is an important difference in how one conceives intentionality. I have explained my choice already. 'Is contained in' is a metaphor. I take it to mean something like this: it would not be *that* act (hearing that sound) without that sound. So the object contained is something essential to the identity of the mental phenomenon. In any case, I see no way of construing this idea so that it does not cast much too wide a net for identifying the intentional. The act of washing the dinner plates contains within it those plates, even when done by a machine. Perhaps the net seems narrower if we think of the object of the act as what need have no existence independent of the act. But we have now disposed of that idea.

Crane casts a perhaps narrower net later in identifying "two main elements of the concept of intentionality". These are "the apparent relational structure of intentionality", and "the perspectival, or fine-grained nature of intentionality". (1998: 12.) The relevant relational structure relates a subject (thinker) and the object of the state (episode, etc.). Relational structure on its own does little to identify the intentional. There is a relational structure—via the *being stained by* relation—between a thinker and that bowl of soup which stained his trousers. A lot hangs here, I think, on the word 'apparent'. The idea, I think, is that the *phenomenon* may still be instanced, the

condition still obtain, even though the relevant relation *only* appears to, but does not, hold: there is no second term for a subject to relate to. I cannot be stained by non-existent soup. But I can look for soup when there is none. Merely apparent relational structure, so understood, is, I have argued, an illusion: what I relate, and appear to relate, to in looking for something is a way for things to be, which I would like to be helping to be instanced. Where that way requires some object to exist (I am 'looking for that diamond as big as the Ritz'), and it does not, there is nothing I am looking for; which is to say: I am only under the illusion of looking for something; *true* descriptions of me as so looking are descriptions of how things are in my illusion.

As for fine-grainedness, there are two ways of understanding this. The first idea is: whenever I bear a fine-grained relation to something, I always do so from some perspective, or vantage point, on it. If I am looking for an honest man, I do that with a certain picture of what it is to be an honest man. If I see the lion in the grass, I do that from a certain perspective on the lion. If I am stained with soup, I do that from a particular perspective: me below the soup, the waiter hovering with it above. This idea is not much help. The second idea is: my perspective actually enters, somehow, as, in effect, a further term in the relation. So I am not just looking for an honest man *full stop*. Rather, I may be looking for one under one 'mode of presentation' of *being an honest man*, not under some other. *If* looking for is really like that, 'N is looking for \_\_\_' may be intensional.

So reading Crane's two main elements, seeing, at least seeing what is before you, remains non-intentional. I do not see the lion under some modes of presentation, not under others. I see it, or not. Of course, seeing it from different perspectives (angles) makes different information about it available to me. That is another matter. And seeing is not liable to be merely apparently relational. We could keep looking for other notions of intentionality on which seeing would be intentional. But should we?

Thinking of perception as intentional has, in fact, distorted thought about it. It has, for one thing, engendered a feeling that one needs to find something for it to be directed towards; something like a 'correctness condition' for seeing what one does on an occasion. Which moves some to find in perception something simply not there: representational content, that is, representing such-and-such as so. Knowing, like seeing, is not an intentional phenomenon, if we conceive intentionality as above. But it is related to what, if anything, is intentional: *thinking* something so. It is related, for one thing, by a rational retreat: I *thought* I knew, but now I see I only thought so. Suppose knowing were a hybrid, an amalgam of *thinking* something so, and some further conditions, of the obtaining of which a subject need not be aware. Then one could so conceive intentionality that knowing simply inherits its intentionality from that thinking-so which is a component of it. We need not look for it to pass, on its own, any further tests. So if you think knowing just *has* to be intentional, you have motive to try to make it out to be a hybrid. Similarly, some have thought, for seeing. I *thought* I saw a rabbit in the grass. But now I see that it only *appeared* that way. On the model of knowing, perhaps seeing is a hybrid of things appearing such-and-such way, and further conditions obtaining of which visual awareness is not needed, nor, perhaps, possible. Then seeing can be intentional in the same way as knowing on the above plan. (Crane sees the connection here. His defence of Brentano's thesis rests, explicitly, on seeing (experiences of) seeing as representing things as so, hence as hybrid.) But there are serious

objections to the idea that either knowing or perceiving is a hybrid. (Frege showed why seeing cannot be so conceived.) In which case, insofar as there is any point to the idea of directedness, the best course will be just to acknowledge that some mental phenomena are intentional, some are not.<sup>1</sup>

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